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Terrorism and the Terrors of Definition 
NORMAN w. PROVIZER 
Louisiana State University, Shreveport 
"We live," to borrow the words of J. Bowyer Bell, "in a time of ter-
ror.'' 1 Whatever debates exist over the exact scope and salience of this 
phenomenon, the emergence of terrorism as a major issue irt the contem-
porary world remains an incontrovertible fact of political life. As Sunday 
Times defence correspondent Tony Geraghty noted in his introduction to 
the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies survey Ten Years of 
Terrorism (published in 1979), "Over the last ten years, terrorism in Europe 
has moved out of the fictitious world of James Bond to become a contem-
porary problem as ubiquitous as drug abuse and environmental 
pollution. " 2 
Of course, neither the term nor the phenomenon it attempts to reflect is 
new to the world. Some 900 years ago, the "Society of Assassins," founded 
by Hassan Ibn Sabah, used the weapon of assassination as a tool of terror: a 
tool that made the Society " ... a powerful force in the Arab world for 200 
years .... " 3 And, with the French Revolution and the Reign of Terror, the 
term clearly gained its foothold in history.• 
Yet the explosion in interest in terrorism qua terrorism is of much more 
recent vintage. This point is brought home by an examination of the entries 
in two major, annotated, bibliographic volumes on the subject - one com-
piled by Norton and Greenberg, the other by Edward Mickolus. 5 In both 
cases, somewhere between 99.6 and 99.7 percent of the general works cited 
were published from 1968 on. Little wonder then that Bowyer Bell and 
others address contemporary history in epochal terms regarding the 
phenomenon of terrorism. 
The attention given terrorism, however, has not been without its 
frustrations: the primary one of which is the seeming inability to define the 
term in a universally accepted fashion. Bowyer Bell could label the modern 
era as "a time of terror," while also arguing " ... there is no satisfactory 
political definition of terror extant or forthcoming, there is similarly no 
common academic consensus as to the essence of terror and no common 
language with which to shape a model acceptable to political scientists or 
social psychologists. " 6 "No one," in other words, "has a definition ofter-
rorism. " 7 Though the subject has moved out of the shadows onto the center 
stage of global interest, it continues to lead a penumbra-like existence, 
definitionally speaking. 
To understand terrorism, "one must seek to understand what is hap-
pening to whom, where, when, how, why and with what outcomes and ef-
fects. " 1 There has been no shortage of efforts to link such factors together 
in definitional packages, only a shortage of agreement as to value of the 
packages produced. As such, it is not that "no one" possesses a definition 
of terrorism, but that everyone has his or her own definition of the 
phenomenon. 
This problem is well illustrated in the single, most comprehensive, 
published survey on terrorism - the volume Political Terrorism: A Research 
Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature by Alex Schmid. 9 
In a questionnaire distributed to authors in the field, Schmid, of the Centre 
For the Study of Social Conflicts at the State University of Leiden in the 
Netherlands, asked, "Whose definition of terrorism do you find adequate 
for your purposes?" The highest number of citations went to "no adequate 
definition" (10), followed by the "my own definition is adequate" response 
(9). Five definitions were cited by more than one respondent in the survey. 
E. V. Walter was on the top of this list with five citations. Thomas Thorn-
ton, Martha Crenshaw (Hutchinson), Paul Wilkinson, and Brian Jenkins 
(with Janera Johnson) each had three citations. The United States Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Justice was cited twice and 22 other sources were 
cited once by the survey's respondents. 10 
The same questionnaire also asked the participants in the select sample 
how they felt about efforts to reach commonly accepted definitions "in the 
field of political violence in general and terrorism in particular." Here, 56 
percent of the 50 respondents expressed the view that such agreement was a 
''necessary precondition for cumulative research.'' 11 
When the lack of definitional consensus is combined with the perceived 
need for such consensus in the study of terrorism, the student of the subject 
appears to face an intractable barrier. Yet that is not quite the case. Though 
definitional disagreements are abundant, there is, nevertheless, a common 
image of terrorist activities: an image sufficiently clear to allow data gather-
ing to take place and the data bases produced to gain wide recognition. The 
Rand Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism and the 
ITERATE Project (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) 
available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research in Ann Arbor represent two such efforts. 12 
In the Rand Chronology, international terrorism is described as '' ... a 
single incident or a campaign of violence waged outside the presently ac-
cepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war. It is often 
designed to attract worldwide attention to the existence and cause of the ter-
rorists and to inspire fear. Often the violence is carried out for effect. The 
actual victim or victims of terrorist attacks and the target audience may not 
be the same; the victims may be totally unrelated to the struggle."' 3 
For the ITERATE Project, terrorism was operationally defined as 
" ... the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extra-normal violence for 
political purpose by any individual or group, whether acting for or in op-
position to established governmental authority, when such action is in-
tended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than 
the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of 
its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims 
or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national 
boundaries." Under ITERATE, international terrorism involves such ac-
tivity wherein the perpetrators are controlled by states, while in transna-
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tional terrorism the perpetrators are essentially autonomous non-state ac-
tors. 1 • 
Neither the Rand description nor the ITERATE operational definition 
is without flaws. Still, they have been sufficient to offer reasonable working 
approaches to data gathering . The reason for this is that despite differing 
definitions of terrorism, there remains a certain sense of congruence con-
cerning many of the critical elements associated with the phenomenon. 
Based on a content analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism, Schmid 
describes the frequency with which certain elements appear. ' 5 First on the 
frequency chart is the element of violence/ force at 83.5 percent, followed 
by political intent at 65 percent. An emphasis on fear / terror is the third-
ranking element found in over half of the definitions in the sample (51 per-
cent) . 
The ideas of threat and psychological effects and anticipated reactions 
are next on the list (at 47 and 41.5 percent respectively). The distinction 
' drawn between the victims and the actual targets of terrorism represents the 
sixth-ranked element (at 37 .5 percent), while purposive / systematically 
planned action stands as the seventh-ranked element (at 32 percent). Discus-
sions of the actual method of combat/strategy / tactics, the lack of 
humanitarian constraints linked to the violation of accepted norms of 
behavior, and the use of coercion / extortion to induce compliance round out 
the top ten elements in the frequency chart (at 30.5, 30 and 28 percent 
respectively) . 
Two added elements - publicity and the act's impersonal/in-
discriminate character - appear with frequencies over 20 percent (21.5 and 
21 percent). Six more elements fall within the more -than-10-but-Iess-
than-20 percent frequency range. They are: emphasis on the civilian/ non-
combatant status of victims (17.5 percent); emphasis on intimidation (17 
percent); emphasis on the innocence of the victims (15.5 percent); emphasis 
on a group / movement as perpetrator (14 percent); and emphasis on the 
act's symbolic / demonstrational dimension (13.5 percent). 
The 22 elements in the Schmid frequency chart end with the unpredict-
ability of the act (9 percent), its clandestine nature (9 percent), its repetitive 
aspect (7 percent), its criminal nature (6 percent) and the demand s it places 
on third parties (4 percent). 
Such a checklist does not provide a definition per se. In fact, Schmid 
notes that the exercise in analyzing the frequency distribution of the 
elements of terrorism does not lead to " ... a true or correct definition of 
terrorism ." 16 But if a definition providing for consistent use of the term by 
all parties remains a chimera, the frequency analysis does point to the cen-
tral elements connected to terrori sm upon which considerable agreement 
exists. 
This agreement provides the basis, then, for Schmid's attempt at 
definition: 
Terrorism is a method of combat in which random 
or symbolic victims serve as instrumental target(s) of 
violence. These instrumental victims share group or 
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class characteristics which form the basis for their selec-
tion for victimization. Through previous use of violence 
or th~ credible threat of violence other members of that 
group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). 
This group or class, whose members' sense of security is 
purposively undermined, is the target of terror. The vic-
timization of the target of violence is considered ex-
tranormal by most observers from the witnessing au-
dience on the basis of its atrocity; the time (e.g. 
peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization 
or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conven-
tional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive 
audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this au-
dience might in turn form the main object of manipula-
tion. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is 
either to immobilize the target of terror in order to pro-
duce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize 
secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or 
targets of attention (e.g. public opinion) to changes of 
attitude or behavior favoring the short or long-term in-
terests of the users of this method of combat. 11 
Schmid's definitional effort gives considerable attention to the target 
dimension of terrorism (distinguishing victims of violence not only from the 
actual target of terror but also from targets of demand and attention)." It 
further focuses on the dimensions of purpose and context, and, to a lesser 
extent, on the acts that differentiate terrorism from other violent activities. 
Schrnid's approach, however, consciously avoids dealing with motives - a 
dimension that is often used to separate crusaders from criminals or crazies, 
and, as such, one that is closely related to the second-ranked citation in his 
frequency chart, i.e., political intent. 19 This definitional effort also says lit-
tle about the perpetrators of terrorism, thereby implying that there is no 
unique attribute of the phenomenon linked to those who carry it out. In this 
sense, it sidesteps the extremely contentious debate over whether direct or 
indirect terror used as state policy is indistinguishable from the insurgency 
or challenge terrorism that has captured international headlines and atten-
tion. 20 Similarly, the elimination of a description of perpetrators from the 
"definition" turns distinctions drawn between transnational terrorism and 
other manifestations of terror-using and inducing activities into what is, at 
best, a secondary consideration. 
Though there is significant support for the expansive view of terrorism, 
which blurs such lines under the call for academic objectivity, there are also 
serious questions about the ultimate utility and value of the expansive ap-
proach. 21 Take, for example, Schmid's discussion of the Reign of Terror. In 
his words, "Those who had originally supported the draconian measures of 
Robespierre began to fear for their lives and conspired to overthrow him. 
They could not accuse him of the Terror since they had declared it to be the 
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legitimate form of government, so they accused him of 'Terrorism' which 
had an illegal and repulsive flavour. " 22 
In this context, the switch appears to be nothing more than a game of 
political semantics in which a negative label is substituted for a positive one. 
Yet there is more to it than that. The state variable carries with it important 
implications that should not be readily dismissed. From a judgmental 
perspective, this does not mean that "thugs" who hold office are somehow 
better than "thugs" without state positions who wantonly slaughter in-
nocents. The excessive and difficult to justify violence of state terror is 
neither more nor less moral than anti-state terrorism. But the shared com-
ponent of "terror" does not mean that it is profitable, in either intellectual 
or policy terms, to collapse two distinct phenomena into a single category. 
The boundary maintenance problems involved in the concept of terrorism 
are severe enough without this type of overextension. Look, for example, at 
the question of nuclear weapons. In the future, if terrorists of the transna-
tional kind were to gain access to nuclear weapons, would one then argue 
that such a situation is indistinguishable from the nuclear "balance ofter-
ror" that came into existence soon after the end of World War II? Or, quite 
to the contrary, would one examine common elements while still recogniz-
ing the differing conditions that distinguish the two phenomena? 
It seems rather obvious that the latter, conceptually narrower path 
makes considerably more sense than the path of overextension. After all, as 
Louis Rene Beres notes in his discussion of a nuclear apocalypse, " .. . ter-
rorist groups tend to operate under a different meaning of rationality than 
do states .. . terrorists are often insensitive to the kinds of retaliatory threats 
that are the traditional mainstay of order between states. " 23 In short, the 
state variable matters. 
Essentially, terror is a tactic that can be utilized in a variety of contexts, 
for a broad range of purposes, generated by a wide spectrum of motives. 
Thus terror is a component in many activities. The question then is how 
much space within a given activity is occupied by this component. In ter-
rorism, unlike its neighboring reference categories (from state terror to 
guerrilla warfare), the terror component is the preeminent and 
preponderate component of the whole of which it is a part. 
Whatever else is said about terrorism, its almost total concentration on 
targets of opportunity (i.e., the defenseless) provides it with its special 
distasteful flavor whether or not one seeks to justify its occurrence. 
In his book Political Terrorism, Grant Wardlaw reminds us that, "A 
major stumbling block to the serious study of terrorism is that, at base, ter-
rorism is a moral problem. " 24 Different groups, with differing stakes and 
perspectives, therefore apply or reject the label accordingly. "One man's 
terrorist," in other words, "is another man's patriot." As Yassir Arafat 
stated in his 1974 United Nations speech, "He who fights for a just cause, 
he who fights for the liberation of his country, he who fights against inva-
sion and exploitation or singlemindedly against colonialism, can never be 
defined a terrorist." 25 
This view, however, mistates the moral dimensions of the subject. It 
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may be that under a given set of circumstances, an individual or group is en-
titled to violently break some eggs in order to make a just omelette. But 
what eggs are chosen and the method in which they are broken are never 
outside the realm of proper moral judgments. Just cause or not, he who per-
forms acts of terrorism is a terrorist. And because terrorism violates the 
norms associated with the discriminating and proportional use of violence, 
it leaves itself open to moral condemnation regardless of its results and its 
political orientations. 26 
In a thoughtful essay on "Motives, Means and Consequences," Joseph 
Nye, Jr. notes that, "No formula can solve a moral dilemma. " 21 In a 
similar vein, one might argue that no definition can solve the dilemma con-
nected to terrorism when terrorism is seen as a moral problem. Yet this does 
not mean that no alternative exists to the "terrorist / patriot" cliche. 
It is possible to avoid "one dimension ethics" and still render mean-
ingful moral judgments. 21 In this regard, judgments need to invoke the 
multiple dimensions of motives, means and consequences. As a philosophy 
of means, terrorism is subject to judgment based on means alone. At the 
same time, the judgment on means may be shaded (but not eliminated) by 
the consideration of motives and consequences . 
Thus we come full circle, back to the question of definition. Without 
an unambiguous definition, is the use of the term nothing more than an ex-
ercise in advocacy, a verdict rooted solely in social judgment? 29 Here it is 
worth considering a comment made by Potter Stewart in 1964. Seven years 
after the United States Supreme Court first entered the murkey waters of 
obscenity, the late justice said this about hard-core ponography: 
I shall not attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that short-
hand description and perhaps I could never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so. But I do know it when I see it, and 
the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 10 
In terms of distinguishing the phenomenon in question (hard-core por-
nography) from related phenomena, Stewart's words clearly fail to offer a 
sufficiently coherent and constant statement (definition) allowing for a 
purely logical and rational application of the term in specific and varying 
circumstances. But despite this definitional barrier, Stewart's "I do know it 
when I see it" comment should not be viewed as a completely arbitrary or 
capricious exercise. Stewart, in essence, was dealing with pornography the 
way Bowyer Bell has dealt with terror, as " .. . a condition known implicitly 
to most men, but which is somehow beyond rigorous examination. " 11 This 
implicit knowledge is not a matter of whim, but of agreement (articulated or 
not) on the critical elements that constitute the core of each activity. 
From this perspective, the debate over definition is less significant than 
the debate over the propriety of the action, that is its morality. Opponents 
and defenders of pornography do not really disagree over what constitutes 
the phenomenon. Instead, the debate really centers on its acceptability 
under given sets of circumstances . Seen in this light, the search for greater 
definitional finality is "like the anti-hero in a lost generation novel, looking 
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for God in the wrong places. " 32 
Such is also the case with terrorism. Take away the emotive connota-
tions of the term and the definitional disagreements rapidly fade in 
significance. Ultimately, as a moral matter, terrorism is perhaps best ap-
proached in the same way a French peasant spoke in the 16th century of the 
religious wars in that country: ''Who will believe that your cause is just 
when your behaviors are so unjust?" ll 
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